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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
l

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

:

v.

:

ROBERT P. HAGEN,

:

Case No.

Category No. 13

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following questions are presented for review:
1.

Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that

this Court could not reach a decision in State v. Perank, Case
No. 860196, a pending case, contrary to Ute Indian Tribe v. State
of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied,
479 U.S. 994 (1986), that would have any practical effect?
2.

Did the court of appeals erroneously refuse to

remand defendant's case to the trial court for reconsideration of
the jurisdictional question under a correct allocation of proof
and a proper standard of proof?
OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals' opinion was issued on November
23, 1990, and appears in State v. Hagen, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 44
(Utah Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1990) (a copy of the opinion is contained
in the addendum).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the questions presented for review is
contained in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Robert P. Hagen, was charged with
distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (R. 1).
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pleaded guilty to
the charge (R. 33, 36-43).

Prior to sentencing, defendant filed

a motion to arrest judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea,
challenging the court's jurisdiction on the basis that he was an
Indian who had allegedly committed a crime in Indian country and
thus was subject to federal court jurisdiction only (R. 53-58).
At the evidentiary hearing on his motion to arrest
judgment and to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant presented the
following evidence in an effort to establish that he was an
Indian for purposes of avoiding state criminal jurisdiction:
(1) that defendant had lived on Indian reservations all his life,
attending their schools and using their hospitals (T. 4); (2)
that he had lived on the Uintah Indian Reservation for the past
six or seven years, attending some of the Ute Tribe's business
meetings and nearly all of their pow wows (T. 5-6); (3) that
although he is not a member of the Ute Tribe, he is a member of

the Little Shell Tribe of the Chippewa Indians, a tribe which is
not recognized by the federal government (T. 7; Def. Ex. 3 & 4);
(4) that he had received money distributed from a fund
administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)—a fund that
had been created pursuant to a money judgment won by various
bands of the Pembina Chippewa Indians (T. 6-8; Def. Ex. 2); (5)
that he had received free health care from the Indian Health
Service (IHS) his entire life (T. 10); and (6) that he had
5/16ths Indian blood (T. 11).
In a brief cross-examination of defendant, the State
established that defendant had no Ute Indian blood; that his
mother, although an Indian, was not an enrolled member of any
tribe; that his father was not an Indian; that he had a
grandmother who was an Indian and a grandfather who was halfIndian; and that he received no benefits in Utah other than the
free health care from IHS

(T. 11-13).

The State presented no

independent evidence.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied
defendant's motion, sentenced him to a term of zero to five years
in the Utah State Prison, and ordered him to pay various fines
and restitution (R. 61, 63-64; T. 25-26).
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed defendant's
conviction and ordered him discharged, concluding that (1) under
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985)
(en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986), Myton, Utah was

Defendant qualified this by indicating that he also was
receiving money from the BIA every year (T. 13).

within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian
Reservation, and that the Utah Supreme Court could not reach a
contrary decision in State v. Perank, Case No. 860196, a pending
case; (2) the trial court had applied an incorrect burden and
standard of proof in ruling that defendant was not an Indian for
jurisdictional purposes; and (3) remand to the trial court for a
determination of defendant's Indian status under a correct
allocation of the burden of proof and a proper standard of proof
was not appropriate.

State v. Hagen, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah

Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1990).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED
THAT THIS COURT COULD NOT REACH A DECISION IN
STATE V. PERANK, CASE NO. 860196, A PENDING
CASE, CONTRARY TO UTE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE
OF UTAH, 773 F.2D 1087 (10TH CIR. 1985) (EN
BANC), CERT. DENIED, 479 U.S. 994 (1986),
THAT WOULD HAVE ANY PRACTICAL EFFECT.
In the trial court the State argued as one alternative
basis for jurisdiction in state court that Myton, Utah is not
within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation
(T. 18). In ruling that it had jurisdiction over defendant, the
trial court did not address that question, basing its decision
solely on its determination that defendant was not an Indian (T.
25).
In Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087
(10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986),
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Myton was within the
exterior boundaries of the reservation.

However, the issue of

whether Myton is actually within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation is currently before this Court in State v. Perankf
Case No. 860196.

The State noted this fact to the court of

appeals in the instant case and suggested that the court wait for
a decision in Perank before issuing an opinion.

The State argued

that if this Court were to conclude in Perank that Myton is not
within the reservation, there would be no question the trial
court had criminal jurisdiction over defendant.
at 4-5.

Br. of Appellee

See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-

49 (1973); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 459 (7th Cir.)
(state court has jurisdiction to punish an Indian who commits a
crime off the reservation and within state territory), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 864 (1984).

Nevertheless, the court of appeals

concluded:
The Tenth Circuit's decision does not appear
to hold open any role for the state courts in
refining its holding in Ute Indian Tribe.
While we have not been acquainted with the
precise arguments advanced by the state in
Perank, we are hard-pressed to see how, given
the Supremacy Clause and the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, our state courts could
reach a contrary decision that would have any
practical effect. Seeing no possibility of
an effective decision in Perank contrary to
the result in Ute Indian Tribe, we see no
reason to await the Perank decision,
especially since defendant is presently
incarcerated.
State v. Haqen, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 44 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 23,
1990).
This conclusion is contrary to the clear import of a
number of decisions from other jurisdictions—i.e., that this
Court is entitled to its own view on reservation status. See,

e.g., State v. Janisf 317 N.W.2d 133 (S.D. 1982); Stankey v.
Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1977).

Indeed, certiorari was

granted by the United States Supreme Court in both DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 430-31 (1975), and Solem v.
Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 466 (1984), because the Supreme Court of
South Dakota had reached a different result than had the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals on whether a reservation had been
disestablished.

See also State v. Perank, Case No. 860196, Br.

of Respondent at 5-7.

And, for the reasons argued in its brief

to this Court in Perank, the State's position is that the Tenth
Circuit incorrectly concluded in Ute Indian Tribe that Myton is
within the reservation.
By considering the Utah state courts bound by the
decision in Ute Indian Tribe, the court of appeals decided an
important question of law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court.

See Utah R. App. P. 46(d).

Accordingly,

certiorari should be granted to review the court of appeals'
decision that this Court cannot decide Perank in a manner
contrary to Ute Indian Tribe and that Myton is therefore within
the reservation.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO
REMAND DEFENDANT'S CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL
QUESTION UNDER A CORRECT ALLOCATION OF THE
BURDEN OF PROOF AND A PROPER STANDARD OF
PROOF.
In the court of appeals, the State conceded that the
trial court had incorrectly placed the burden on defendant to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was an Indian,

acknowledging that under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3) (1990) the
State had the ultimate burden of proving jurisdiction (i.e., that
defendant was not an Indian) by a preponderance of the evidence.
Hagen, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44; Br. of Appellee at 5-9.

The

State then requested that defendant's case be remanded to the
trial court for a determination of defendant's indian status
under a correct allocation of proof and a proper standard of
proof.

Ibid.

This request was premised on the fact that both

the trial court and prosecutor had proceeded under a
misinterpretation of the law in an area that had not yet been
settled by a Utah appellate court (i.e., what burden and standard
of proof applied to the Indian status question for purposes of
state criminal jurisdiction). Furthermore, the question of
Indian status for jurisdictional purposes is a question of fact
which is most appropriately determined by the trial court.

See

United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d at 457 (Indian status for
jurisdiction is a question of fact on which the government
carries the burden).
The court of appeals rejected the State's request for a
remand on the grounds that, given the evidence developed in the
trial court, the State simply could not carry its burden of
establishing jurisdiction, and that the State is not "entitled to
a second chance to put on evidence addressed to the
jurisdictional issue."

148 Utah Adv. Rep. at 45.

On the latter

point, the Court stated that "[w]hen reversal results from the
failure of the state to prove jurisdiction, further trial
proceedings are not in order; [o]n the contrary, the conviction

is reversed and the defendant is ordered discharged."

Ibid,

(citing State v. Sorenson# 758 P.2d 466, 470 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)).

This suggests that the court of appeals considered

further proceedings to be barred on double jeopardy grounds.
However, such a conclusion is inconsistent with authority from
other jurisdictions, see, e.g., State v. Miller, 47 Ohio App.3d
113, 547 N.E.2d 399 (1988); State v. Lovef 5 Kan.App.2d 768, 625
P.2d 7 (1981); State v. Russo# 70 Wis.2d 169, 233 N.W.2d 485
(1975), and with the plain language of section 76-1-501(3) which
explicitly states that the existence of jurisdiction is not an
element of the crime.
Thus, in refusing to remand defendant's case pursuant
to the State's request, the court of appeals decided an important
question of law which has not been, but should be, settled by
this Court.

Accordingly, certiorari should be granted to review

the court of appeals' ruling on the remand issue.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c ^ ^ ^ d a y of January, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Harry
Souvall, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, Utah 84078, for forwarding
to Robert P. Hagen, Defendant-Respondent, whose address is not
known to the State, this <*& day of January, 1991.

ADDENDUM

Hagen
Jv. Rep. 44

I do not believe the issue will forever evade
review unless this court addresses the issue in a
case that is moot. It is only for this reason
that I do not view it as proper to decide the
merits of the instant cases under the exception
to the mootness doctrine.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

Cite as
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Robert P. HAGEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900095-CA
FILED: November 23,1990
Eighth District, Duchesne County
Honorable Dennis L. Draney
ATTORNEYS:
Harry H. Souvall, Vernal, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme.
Sitting in Vernal, Utah1
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ORME, Judge:
Defendant appeals his conviction on the
narrow ground that the crime for which he
was convicted, selling marijuana, was committed at Myton, Utah, a location within the
territorial confines of the Uintah and Ouray
Indian Reservation, and that the state failed to
establish the court's jurisdiction over him
when it failed to prove he is not an Indian
when confronted with his claim that he is. See,
e.g., State v. St. Francis, 151 Vt. 3B4, 563
A.2d 249, 251 (1989) ("If defendants are
'Indians' and the crimes were committed
within 'Indian country,' then Vermont has no
jurisdiction over defendants."); People v.
Luna, 683 P.2d 362, 365 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984) (state lacks jurisdiction to prosecute
Indian defendants for alleged sale and distribution of controlled substances in "Indian
country").
The state concedes on appeal that the trial
court erred in requiring defendant to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that he is in
fact an Indian. The state properly concedes
that the prosecution was required to prove
jurisdiction, i.e., that defendant was not an

CODE#CO
Provo.Utah

Indian, albeit only by a preponderance of
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Sorenson, 758
P.2d 466,469-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The state advances two arguments against
reversal notwithstanding these concessions.
First, it suggests that the precise question of
whether Myton is really within the confines of
the reservation is presently before the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of State v. Perank,
No. 860196, and that we should defer our
consideration of this case until the decision in
that case is issued. Second, it argues that we
should remand, either to let the trial court
reassess the evidence before it with the matters
of burden of proof and evidentiary standard
correctly in mind or, preferably, to give the
state the chance to put on additional jurisdictional evidence since its failure to put on
sufficient evidence resulted from an honest
mistake on its part, shared by the trial court,
concerning who had the burden of proof on
defendant's claimed Indian status.
Both arguments may be summarily dealt
with. The federal courts, construing federal
statutes, federal regulations, and federal
Indian policy, have determined that Myton is
within the confines of the reservation. See Ute
Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 773 F.2d 1087
(10th Cir. 1985)(en banc), cert, denied, 479
U.S. 994 (1986). See also Ute Indian Tribe v.
State of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1188 (D.
Utah 1981) (map appended to court's opinion
depicts Myton as being well within both
present and historical boundaries of Uintah
and Ouray Reservation). The Tenth Circuit's
decision does not appear to hold open any role
for the state courts in refining its holding in Ute
Indian Tribe. While we have not been
acquainted with the precise arguments advanced by the state in Perank, we are hardpressed to see how, given the Supremacy
Clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
our state courts could reach a contrary decision that would have any practical effect.
Seeing no possibility of an effective decision in
Perank contrary to the result in Ute Indian
Tribe, we see no reason to await the Perank
decision, especially since defendant is presently
incarcerated.
Nor would remand be appropriate. The only
testimony concerning whether defendant is an
Indian is that which was offered by defendant
himself. Defendant testified that he has lived
on Indian reservations all his life, that he has
attended reservation schools and been treated
at reservation hospitals, that he is a member
of the Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians,
that he had received proceeds from a judgment entered in favor of various bands of the
Chippewas pursuant to a distribution made by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and that his
ancestry is 5/16ths I n d i a n . Crossexamination established that defendant was
not a Ute, that he was not actually "enrolled"
in any tribe, and that his father was not an

CODE* CO
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Indian. Under the applicable test, there is
simply no way this evidence could be
'weighed" by the trial court to come to the
conclusion that the state had met its burden of
proving jurisdiction by proving that defendant
is not an Indian. Indeed, even if the court
chose to discredit defendant's testimony
completely, the result would be that there is
no evidence in the record at all concerning
defendant's Indian or non-Indian status. The
state simply could not meet its burden in the
absence of any evidence establishing jurisdiction.
Nor is the state entitled to a second chance
to put on evidence addressed to the jurisdictional issue. When reversal results from the
failure of the state to prove jurisdiction,
further trial proceedings are not in order. On
the contrary, the conviction is reversed and the
defendant is ordered discharged. See, e.g.,
Sorcnson, 758 P.2d at 470. We have not been
shown that any exception exists where the
failure of proof stems from a good-faith
mistake on the part of the prosecution.5
Defendant's conviction is reversed and he is
ordered discharged.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge

as a 'significant percentage," the historical debate
treated in the cases focusing on whether twonxteenths is enough. See, e.g., Sully v. United
States, 195 F. 113 (8th Or. 1912) (one-eighth
Indian blood is sufficient); ViaJpando v. State, 640
P.2d 77, 80 (Wyo. 1982) (one-eighth Indian blood
not sufficient). The "recognition" requirement is
more fluid. See, e.g., St. Cloud v. United States,
702 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D. S.D. 1988) (factors to
consider include government provision of "assistance
reserved only to Indians," receiving "benefits of
tribal affiliation," living on a reservation). Formal
enrollment in a federally recognized tribe is not
required. Id.
3. We assume the vast majority of instances where
the prosecution fails to meet its burden to prove
jurisdiction results from some honest mistake on its
part concerning its burden and how to meet it.

1. Oral argument in this case was heard in Vernal,
Utah. This court has frequently sat in locations
other than the court's facility in Salt Lake City, as
permitted by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-5 (1987).
To date, panels of the court have heard argument in
both Vernal and Richfield on two separate occasions, as well as in Logan, Brigham City, Cedar City,
St. George, Fillmore, and Manti. The cases heard
'on circuit" typically arose in the general area, and
often one or both attorneys reside in the area.
Clients who might otherwise have to pay for an
attorney's time in traveling to Salt Lake City can be
spared that expense. Parties who might not be able
to come to Salt Lake to hear their cases argued can
often do so in their own or a nearby community.
School classes have occasionally attended our proceedings. Local sheriffs and court personnel have
invariably been cooperative and, with the exception
of an occasional glitch with unfamiliar recording
equipment and one instance of a motel operator
mistaking us for dog-show judges, our sessions
outside Salt Lake have come off without incident.
The court remains firm in its commitment to hold
sessions throughout the state, as local caseloads
warrant and our own calendaring demands permit.
2.
Two elements must be satisfied before it
can be found that (a defendant] is an
Indian under federal law. Initially, it
must appear that he has a significant
percentage of Indian blood. Secondly,
the [defendant] must be recognized as an
Indian either by the federal government
or by some tribe or society of Indians. Cofonh v. State, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla. Grim.
1982). Five-sixteenths Indian blood clearly qualifies
T DPPriBTS

